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"Equal Access" to Alaska's Fish and
Wildlife
STEPHEN M. WHITE*
This article analyzes the Alaska Supreme Court's treatment of the
equal access clauses of the Alaska Constitution in the context of
fish and wildlife management. The article begins by tracing the
history and application of each of the equal access clauses. Then,
the article examines some of the common themes among the equal
access clauses. The analysis next turns to the court's efforts to
harmonize equal access jurisprudence with the "preference among
beneficial uses" and equal protection provisions of the state
constitution. Finally, this article concludes that the court must
further clarify both its definition of "access," as well as the scope
and limitations of the equal access clauses.
I. INTRODUCION
Sections 3, 15 and 17 of Article VIII of the Alaska Constitu-
tion are collectively known as the equal access clauses. These
uniquely Alaskan clauses guarantee equal access to the state's
natural resources to all of Alaska's citizens. Over the past seven
years, the Alaska Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the scope
and meaning of these clauses in fish and wildlife contexts on no
fewer than six occasions.1 Additionally, the court has tried to
reconcile the equal access clauses with a separate constitutional
provision allowing the state to establish preferences among various
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1. The clauses also apply to other resources. See, e.g., Wernberg v. State, 516
P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1973) (waters); CWC Fisheries, Inc., v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115
(Alaska 1988) (tidelands).
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resource uses. The court is presently faced with these issues in
another appeal involving access to fish and wildlife.2 Thus, the
court has an immediate opportunity to more clearly define the
meaning of "access" to fish and wildlife, and to concretely establish
the scope and limitations of the equal access clauses.
This article will analyze the court's treatment of equal access
in the fish and wildlife context to date. First, part II considers the
court's "common use clause"3 jurisprudence. Part III then
discusses decisions under the "no exclusive right of fishery"
clause.' Part IV analyzes the law under the "uniform application
clause."5 Part V then examines some of the unifying principles
and themes of the equal access clauses. Part VI discusses the
relationship between the equal access clauses and other constitu-
tional provisions, such as the "preferences among beneficial uses"
clause and the equal protection clause. Finally, this note concludes
that the court should take the next available opportunity to further
clarify the meaning of "equal access."
II. THE "COMMON USE" CLAUSE
A. Public Trust Principles
Article VIII, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution, often
referred to as the "common use" clause, provides that "[w]herever
occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are
reserved to the people for common use.",6 The Alaska Supreme
Court has called the common use clause "a unique provision, not
modeled on any other state constitution."7 The clause embodies
public trust principles that arise from a long history in this country
of state managed wildlife resources The United States Supreme
2. In State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe, No. S-6162, the state is appealing a
decision holding that the provision in Alaska Statutes section 16.05.258,
authorizing the establishment of nonsubsistence use areas, violates the equal access
clauses. The lower court decision was issued in Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. State, No.
3AN-91-4569 Civil (Alaska Super., Nov. 26, 1993) (final judgment).
3. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
4. ALASKA CONsT. art. VIII, § 15.
5. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 17.
6. ALASKA CONsT. art. VIII, § 3.
7. Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 493 (Alaska 1988).
8. The anti-monopoly purpose of the clause "was achieved by constitutionaliz-
ing common law principles imposing upon the state a public trust duty with regard
to the management of fish, wildlife and waters. The constitutional framers'
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Court has traced this history and concluded that the states have a
trust responsibility to manage wildlife for the benefit of the public,
not for the benefit of individuals or the government itself.9
Although the common use clause was intended to constitution-
alize public trust principles," the Alaska Supreme Court has not
yet decided whether the clause grants greater protection over
public access to natural resources than the public trust doctrine
does toward tidelands and submerged lands." To date, the court
has held only that the "common law principles incorporated in the
common use clause impose upon the state a trust duty to manage
the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for the benefit of
all the people."' 2
reliance on historic principles regarding state management of wildlife and water
resources is evident from a written explanation in the committee materials for the
term 'reserved to the people for common use."' Id. The framers spoke of
"[a]ncient traditions in property rights" which recognize that title to uncaptured
wildlife "is reserved to the people or the state on behalf of the people." Id.
(citing Alaska Constitutional Convention Papers, Folder 210, a paper prepared by
Committee on Resources entitled "Terms").
9. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). Specifically, the Court said that
the state's power over wildlife "is to be exercised, like all other powers of
government, as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for
the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the benefit
of private individuals as distinguished from the public good." Id. at 529. The
Alaska Supreme Court surmised that the framers of the constitution relied heavily
on Geer when they drafted the common use clause. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 495.
10. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 496. Alaska's public trust responsibility to manage
wildlife is comparable to its obligations under the "public trust doctrine," where
the state has a trust duty to protect the public's right of access to certain lands and
navigable waters for certain purposes. See Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892) (generally stating the public trust doctrine). In Alaska, the
public has continuing access to privately held tidelands and submerged lands for
navigation, commerce and fishing. CWC Fisheries, 755 P.2d at 1118.
11. In CWC Fisheries, the court examined whether a state tideland conveyance
was subject to continuing public easements for navigation, commerce, and
fisheries. Analyzing the conveyance under requirements of Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
the court concluded that "[w]e need not decide at this time whether a fee simple
tideland conveyance which satisfied the structures of Illinois Central would
nonetheless run afoul of article VIII, section 3." CWC Fisheries, 755 P.2d at 1120
n.10.
12. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 495.
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B. Broad Public Access to Resources
The Alaska Supreme Court's principal interpretation of the
common use clause regarding access to fish and wildlife can be
found in Owsichek v. State." There the court examined the state's
system for assigning exclusive guiding areas to the big game guide
industry. Under that system, the Alaska Guide Licensing and
Control Board designated geographic areas in which only certain
guides could lead hunts. Although persons could hunt recreational-
ly in an "exclusive guide area" ("EGA"), only the Board-assigned
guide could lead hunts professionally within the designated area. 4
The court concluded that the EGA system could not be justified as
a wildlife management tool because the EGAs were endowed with
many of the characteristics of private property.15 Thus, the court
reasoned that the EGAs "resemble[d] the types of royal grants the
common use clause expressly intended to prohibit.' 6 Although
the court noted that the EGAs may have also violated the uniform
application clause of the Alaska Constitution,17 it struck down
EGAs solely because they violated the common use clause." In
so doing, the court expressed a simple purpose for the common use
clause, namely that it "was intended to guarantee broad public
access to natural resources."' 9
The principle of broad access was reaffirmed and elaborated
upon two years later. In State v. Hebert,0 the court examined a
regulation that established two "superexclusive" use fisheries.
Under this type of fishery management, fishermen 2 must choose
among several geographic areas where a fish species occurs. If a
13. 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
14. Id. at 489. In practice, there were two types of EGA's: truly "exclusive
guide areas," which had only one designated guide in each, and "joint use areas,"
which had several designated guides in each. Id. The court referred to both types
as "EGA's." Id. n.1.
15. Id. at 498.
16. Id. at 497-98.
17. Id. at 498 n.17. The court did not consider this issue in full because the
parties did not include it in their arguments and because the case could be decided
upon other grounds. Id.
18. Id. at 498.
19. Id. at 493.
20. 803 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1990).
21. The term "fishermen" is used for the sake of convenience. The regulation
applied equally to male and females engaged in fishing activities.
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person registers to fish an area designated as "superexclusive," he
or she may not harvest that type of fish in any other area. On the
other hand, if the fisherman registers to fish in an area that is not
"superexclusive," he or she may not fish for the same species in a
"superexclusive" area.' The Hebert court cited evidence
that the number of fishermen would probably increase under this
type of registration-choice system, and thus, it would be possible
for more rather than fewer persons to participate in the fishery.
Therefore, the court upheld the superexclusive use regulation and
noted that "if anything, [it] furthers the interests underlying section
3's common use mandate."'  Thus, "broad public access" is a
principle that favors maximizing the number of persons able to
participate in a hunt or fishery rather than maximizing an in-
dividual's opportunities to catch as much fish or harvest as much
game in as many areas as possible.2 4
C. Common Use Clause Prohibitions
The court held in Owsichek that the common use clause
implicitly prohibits what another equal access clause, the "no
exclusive right of fishery" clause,' prohibits on its face, namely
"special privileges" and "exclusive grants" to fish and wildlife.26
Although the other two article VIII clauses share these prohibi-
tions, the purposes underlying the common use clause are "wholly
apart from the limits imposed by other constitutional pro-
visions. '  Specifically, the common use clause was enacted with
the intent to prevent monopolization of natural resources.'
The common use clause's prohibition against "special privileg-
es" is best examined by its application in resolving the constitution-
ality of the EGA system. When an area was reassigned, the EGA
22. Hebert, 803 P.2d at 864.
23. Id. at 867.
24. This principle was followed by the state when it adopted a replacement for
the EGA system struck down in Owsichek. The new system allows big game
guides to select and register for up to three guiding areas in the state. ALASKA
ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, § 38.820 (April 1994).
25. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15.
26. See Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 496. In an earlier decision, the court stated that
the state's system for limiting entry into commercial fisheries is inconsistent with
the common use clause because it grants an exclusive right to a select few. State
v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).




system favored an applicant who had already used, occupied or
invested in the area. Thus, this procedure worked like a seniority
system that favored established guides over new entrants to the
profession. The court found that such a system created a "special
privilege" in violation of the common use clause.29
The EGA system was also found to be in violation of the "no
exclusive grants" purpose of the common use clause. The prohibi-
tion against "exclusive grants" is another expression of the anti-
monopoly principle against the granting of private rights in a public
resource. Although the EGA system was unique in wildlife
management, the court found it worthwhile to recognize features
that gave it private property status. These features included their
unlimited duration and the fadt that guides could transfer them for
profit without providing compensation to the state.30
The court found that the EGAs constituted an exclusive grant
because they were unlimited in duration. The Alaska Supreme
Court contrasted them with leases and concessions on state lands,
which are limited in time, and therefore do not violate the common
use clause.3' The court noted that limiting entry into guide areas
was inconsistent with the common use clause because it resulted in
an exclusive right that could be exercised season after season.32
The Owsichek court also found that EGAs violated the public
trust rationale underlying the common use clause because their sale
generated no meaningful compensation to the public. The court
again contrasted EGAs with leases and concessions, which do
provide remuneration to the state.33 Previously, the court had
stated in dictum that the shore fisheries leasing program would not
violate the public trust in part because shore fishery leases require
compensation to the state for the use of public trust easements. 34
However, because profits realized from the sale of improvements
constructed in an EGA went solely to the former EGA holder, and
the Alaska Guide Licensing and Control Board routinely trans-
ferred the EGA to the buyer of those improvements, the public
29. Id.
30. Id. at 497.
31. Id. at 496-97.
32. Id. at 497.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing CWC Fisheries, 755 P.2d at 1120-21).
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trust doctrine was undermined by what was essentially an exclusive
grant.35
D. Common Use: Its Scope and Limits
The Alaska courts have held that the "common use" of fish
and wildlife is entitled to a high degree of constitutional protection.
In a 1983 dissent, Justice Rabinowitz introduced this idea, stating
that common use is a "highly important interest running to each
person within the state., 36 In later court decisions a majority has
supported this statement. For example, the court held in Owsichek
that the interest is so vital that grants of exclusive rights are subject
to "close scrutiny."'37 Furthermore, the clause itself makes no
distinction in the level of scrutiny between personal and profession-
al use,38 and it protects both derivative and direct uses of fish and
wildlife.39 Whether direct or derivative, the right protected under
the common use clause must be defined by the nature of the
resource (that is, fish, wildlife or waters) and the nature of the use
(that is, commercial, sport, subsistence or personal use), but not by
a particular method or means of use.4"
However, the common use clause does not govern all uses of
fish and wildlife wherever they may be located. Constitutional
history shows that the clause was not intended to govern the
domestication of fur-bearing animals.4' Furthermore, the common
35. Id. at 496-98.
36. State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1196 (Alaska 1983) (Rabinowitz, J.,
dissenting).
37. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 494.
38. In CWC Fisheries, the court noted that the public trust doctrine guaranteed
fishermen access to public resources for "private commercial purposes" as well as
recreation. 755 P.2d at 1121 n.14. Later that year, the court stated, "[t]he same
[CWC Fisheries] rationale applies to professional hunting guides under the
common use clause." Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 497.
39. The derivative use, however, should be "closely tied" to the actual taking
of the fish or wildlife. For example, although professional hunting guides do not
actually take game themselves, the court said that "[t]he work of a guide is so
closely tied to hunting and taking wildlife that there is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing between the rights of a guide and the rights of a hunter under the
common use clause." Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 497 n.15.
40. See Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n v. State Dep't of Fish and Game, 838 P.2d
798 (Alaska 1992) (holding that the state may regulate the method of using natural
resources without violating the common use clause).




use clause does not govern fish in private ponds or legally regis-
tered trap lines.42 And, although the common use clause protects
the public's right to use fish in natural waterways, it does not
authorize people to trespass over private property to reach the
waters.43
III. THE "No EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF FISHERY" CLAUSE
A. History of the Clause
Article VIII, section 15 of the Alaska Constitution is often
called the "no exclusive right of fishery" clause. It provides:
No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created
or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section
does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any
fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent
economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon
them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient development
of aquaculture in the state."4
Among the equal access clauses, section 15 is unique in two
respects. First, because it applies only to fishery resources, this
clause is narrower than both the common use clause,45 which
applies to wildlife, waters and fish, and the "uniform application"
clause,46 which applies to all natural resources. Second, unlike the
other two clauses, the "no exclusive right of fishery" clause was not
adopted in its entirety along with the original constitution. Only
the first part, prohibiting exclusive rights and special privileges, was
adopted originally. The second part, allowing the state to limit
entry into fisheries, was added as an amendment sixteen years later.
The constitutional framers intended the first part to take the
place of a pre-statehood federal law that regulated Alaska's
fisheries.47 That law, section 1 of the White Act, prohibited
42. Id.
43. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 494 (citing 4 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitu-
tional Convention at 2460 (January 17, 1956)).
44. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15.
45. Id. § 3.
46. Id. § 17.
47. The Committee on Resources of the Constitutional Convention stated that
"[t]his section is intended to serve as a substitute for the provision prohibiting the
several right of fisheries in the White Act." 6 Proceedings of the Alaska
Constitutional Convention 87 (Alaska Legislative Council); see also 1960 Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 9, at 3 (Apr. 8, 1960).
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federal regulations from granting an "exclusive or several right of
fishery."'
The second part of the "no exclusive right of fishery" clause
was submitted as a joint resolution to the Seventh Alaska Legisla-
ture in February 1971. It initially stated that "[t]he State may
restrict entry to any fishery for purposes of conservation of the
resource, to relieve economic distress among fishermen and those
dependent upon them for a livelihood and to insure fair competi-
tion among those engaged in commercial fishing."49 According to
its sponsor, Governor William A. Egan, the purpose of the
resolution was to make it "indisputably clear that the state may act
to conserve and manage its fisheries in a manner which will benefit
all Alaskans."5 Further, the resolution was intended to remove
all doubt that the first part of the clause, which prohibited exclusive
rights of fisheries, did not necessarily prohibit "reasonable gear
limitations or other restrictions on entry in our fisheries."' ' Thus,
the original resolution was considered to be a clarification of the
prohibition against exclusive rights and special privileges, not an
exception to it.
Ultimately, the opening language evolved from "[t]he State
may restrict entry to any fishery ... ," to "[t]his section does not
restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fish-
ery. . ,.52 The legislature believed that the subtle change was
needed to overcome ambiguity arising from the decision in
Bozanich v. Reetz. 5' In Bozanich, the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska held that laws limiting licenses to specific
48. Section I of the White Act reads:
Provided, that every such regulation made by the Secretary of the
Commerce shall be of general application within the particular area to
which it applies, and that no exclusive or several right of fishery shall be
granted therein, nor shall any citizen of the United States be denied the
right to take, prepare, cure, or preserve fish or shellfish in any area of the
waters of Alaska where fishing is permitted by the Secretary of the
Commerce.
White Act of 1924 ch. 272, § 1, 43 Stat. 464.
49. S.J. Res. 10, 7th Leg., 1971 SENATE J. 116.
50. Letter from Governor William A. Egan to Senator Terry Miller, Chairman,
Senate Rules Committee (Feb. 3, 1971) in 1971 SENATE 1. 116.
51. Id.
52. House Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute for S.J. Res. 10, 7th
Leg, 1st Sess. (1971).
53. 297 F. Supp. 300 (D. Alaska 1969), vacated on other grounds and
remanded, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
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groups of fishermen violated both the common use and the "no
exclusive right of fishery" clauses.54 In response to this decision,
the Alaska Legislature altered the opening line in order "to show
that the state's power to limit entry is a specific exception to the
'exclusive right' prohibition."'55 Because the amendment was
intended to create an "exception" to the prohibition against
exclusive rights and special privileges, the prohibition is more
compelling than if the amendment were only intended to provide
clarification.
B. Application of the Clause
In McDowell v. State,56 the Alaska Supreme Court relied
largely on section 15 in interpreting the constitutionality of the
state's criterion for participating in subsistence uses of fish, game
and other wild, renewable resources. Under the 1986 version of
the subsistence law, only persons who resided in rural areas of
Alaska were eligible to enjoy the subsistence priority, while persons
residing in urban areas were excluded from subsistence uses." It
was this rural residency criterion that was challenged under the
equal access clauses.5"
The McDowell court struck down the rural residency criterion,
basing its decision on the "no exclusive right of fishery" clause and
on its pre-statehood predecessor, the White Act. Noting that
section I of the White Act guaranteed access to fisheries regardless
of residence, the court reasoned that "section 15 likewise was
54. Id. at 304-07.
55. House Resources Committee, 1971 HOUSE J. 761 (emphasis added).
56. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
57. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (1987) (amended 1992). The subsistence law
established two different systems, or "tiers," for distinguishing who was eligible to
participate in subsistence uses. The tiers were determined by resource abundance.
When there was enough harvestable resource to satisfy all subsistence uses, that
is, at the "first tier" of abundance, the urban-rural criterion determined eligibility.
When abundance diminished below the point where all subsistence uses could be
satisfied, then rural residents, all of whom who had qualified under the "first tier,"
were further distinguished by their dependence, their local residency and their
availability of alternative resources. Id. This is called the "second tier." The
McDowell court examined the criterion for first-tier eligibility, namely, rural
residency.
58. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 1.
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meant to ensure an equal right to participate in fisheries, regardless
of where one resides." 59
Three years after McDowell, the court again construed the "no
exclusive right of fishery" clause in Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n v.
State Department of Fish and Game.' That case involved a ban
on aerial fish spotting, the practice of using aircraft to locate fish
and direct the operations of commercial fishermen, in the Bristol
Bay salmon fishery.61 The court held that the ban did not violate
the "no exclusive right of fishery" clause. The court found that the
ban furthered equal access because all fishermen were equally
excluded from aerial spotting, and that the pilots were not excluded
from the numerous other uses of the resource.62 This finding
suggests that if a certain method or means is prohibited, and a
group of individuals has no other way to use the resource, the
remaining users may have been granted an unconstitutional
"exclusive right" or "special privilege."'63
Decisions construing the "limited entry" provision of article
VIII, section 15 give further insight into the application of the "no
exclusive right of fishery" clause. The Alaska Supreme Court has
recognized the tension created by the clauses' simultaneous
prohibition of exclusive rights in fisheries and the authorization of
the state to limit entry.' The court has harmonized this apparent
conflict by adopting a test of "least possible impingement."'65 This
goal is achieved by the "optimum number" provision of Alaska
Statutes section 16.43.290. Under this provision, the Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission establishes the optimum number of
permits for each fishery. This number may be greater or less than
59. Id. at 9.
60. 838 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1992).
61. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 06.378 (June 1990).
62. Id. Other uses of the resource, as suggested by the court, were commercial
fishing, participating in industries that support the fish harvest, using their planes
to spot fish before an open harvest and transporting supplies and personnel for
commercial fishing clients. Id. at 802.
63. The court made several other significant findings in upholding the fish
spotter ban. First, it rejected the pilots' claim that they constituted a "user group"
entitled to protection under the common use clause. Id. at 802. The court held
that user groups are defined according to the nature of the resource (fish or
wildlife) and the nature of the use (commercial, sport or subsistence), and not
according to the particular tool used to take the resource. Id.
64. See State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983).
65. Id. at 1191.
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the actual number of permits issued for the fishery. If greater, the
state must issue additional permits until the optimum number is
reached.66 If lesser, the state must buy back permits until the
optimum number is reached.67 The Alaska Supreme Court has
found that this system strikes an acceptable balance between
fishermen's interest in access and the state's interest in conserving
resources.
68
Although limited entry is a unique situation, the "least
impingement" principle may apply to other schemes that would
create a special privilege for a subset of users.69 In those instanc-
es, the inquiry should focus on whether another scheme, less
intrusive upon equal access values, could achieve the same goals.
For example, the Alaska Supreme Court suggested in McDowell
that a system based on individual characteristics could be used to
determine subsistence eligibility so long as it only minimally
infringes upon the rights of those who are excluded.7
As previously discussed, the common use clause does not
prohibit restrictive registration systems, such as "superexclusive"
fisheries, if the system's restrictions on individuals result in greater
public participation." By the same rationale, these systems should
also survive the exclusive use prohibitions of the "no exclusive right
of fishery" clause. It is the element of choice that distinguishes a
system where the state assigns areas (such as the EGA system)
66. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.330 (1992).
67. Id. §§ 16.43.310-320.
68. Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 758 P.2d 1256 (Alaska
1988).
69. Analysis under the "no exclusive right of fishery" clause, as discussed
earlier, applies only to situations where a portion of a user group is granted a
privilege over the remaining members or potential members. The analysis is not
applicable to differential treatment between resource uses, e.g., an advantage given
to sport use over commercial use of a certain fish stock. These "preferences
among beneficial uses" are the crux of fish and wildlife allocations, and they are
specifically endorsed by the constitution. See ALASKA CONsT. art. VIII, § 4;
McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989); Meier v. State 739 P.2d 172 (Alaska
1987); Kenai Peninsula v. State, 628 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1981).
70. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 3.
71. For example, the court came to this conclusion when comparing the
competitive bidding system for allocating leases and exclusive concessions on state
lands with the seniority system for granting EGAs. See Owsichek v. State, 763
P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988). The court found that a bidding system is constitutional
because it allows a wider field of applicants than does a system based on prior use,
occupancy and investment in the area underlying the private rights. Id. at 497.
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from one where users register for areas (such as the superexclusive
registration system). Even though a user may not have access to
all areas, he or she is not initially excluded from any particular
area. Thus, the apparent meaning of "equal access" is that no
citizen enjoys guaranteed and exclusive use of a fish stock or
wildlife population.
IV. THE "UNIFORM APPLICATION" CLAUSE
The third equal access clause, section 17 of Article VIII, is
often called the "uniform application clause." It states:
Laws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural
resources shall apply equally to all persons similarly situated with
reference to the subject matter and purpose to be served by the
law or regulation.'
The legislative history of the "uniform application clause" is sparse.
The commentaries to the constitutional convention refer to it only
once: "This section is intended to exclude any especially privileged
status for any person in the use of natural resources subject to the
disposition of the state."73
The Alaska Supreme Court recently interpreted the "uniform
application" clause in Gilbert v. State.74 There the court examined
regulations allocating salmon among "intercept" and "destination"
fisheries.75 The regulations restrict harvest by fishermen who are
further from spawning grounds in favor of fishermen who are closer
to the grounds.76 Drawing on principles derived from earlier
decisions, the court articulated a test for satisfying the "uniform
application" clause. Because the individual interest in equal access
to fish and game resources is a "highly important interest running
to each person within the state," the state must have an important
purpose to countervail that interest.77 The state then has the
burden of proving that the means used to further its important
purpose are carefully drawn and designed for the "'least possible
infringement on article VIII's open access values."'7
72. ALASKA CONsT. art. VIII, § 17.
73. 6 Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention 84 (Dec. 16, 1955).
74. 803 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1990).
75. Id. at 393.
76. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 18.260 (June 1988).
77. Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 399.
78. Id. (quoting McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1989)).
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A question left open by the Gilbert test concerns the meaning
of "open access." One type of access not likely to be protected by
this test involves access by one user group and a resulting denial of
access to another user group. Inequality of access between user
groups results from the need to allocate resources and derives
support from the constitution's sanction of "preference among
beneficial uses."79 Due to the court's ability to distinguish user
groups, it is unlikely that an allocation conflict would ever reach
the potentially problematic final step of the Gilbert test. Compet-
ing groups will likely differ in meaningful ways and, thus, the issue
would not qualify for analysis under the test. For example, the
opposing fisheries in Gilbert differed in their biological spawning
patterns, historic catch levels, and participation."0 Thus, because
the fisheries were not "similarly situated," there was not a "non-
uniform classification," and the uniform application clause was not
implicated.8
More likely, the Gilbert test applies to situations involving
individual access to resource user groups. This inference derives
from the court's distinction between allocation and limits on
admission to these groups.' This interpretation of Gilbert is also
consistent with the court's decisions in McDowell and the limited
entry cases. All of these cases examined limits on admission to
user groups, not inter-group allocations.
In Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. State,83 however, which is present-
ly pending before the Alaska Supreme Court, a superior court
interpreted the Gilbert decision differently. Kenaitze arose from
the prohibitions on subsistence fishing and hunting established by
a 1992 statute.'4 That statute states:
The boards may not permit subsistence hunting or fishing in a
nonsubsistence area. The boards, acting jointly, shall identify by
regulation the boundaries of nonsubsistence areas. A non-
subsistence area is an area or community where dependence
79. ALASKA CONsT. art. VIII, § 4.
80. Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 399.
81. Similarly, the Gilbert test also did not apply to the ban on fish spotting in
Bristol Bay. Because the ban applied equally to all citizens, there was no "non-
uniform classification" and, therefore, the uniform application clause was not
implicated. Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n v. State Dep't of Fish and Game, 838 P.2d
798, 804 (Alaska 1992).
82. See McDowell, 785 P.2d at 8.
83. No. 3AN-91-4569 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 1993).
84. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(c) (1992).
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upon subsistence is not a principal characteristic of the economy,
culture, and way of life of the area or community ss
Residents of nonsubsistence areas challenged this provision,
claiming it violated the equal access clauses.8 6 Despite finding
that the legislature's purpose for authorizing nonsubsistence areas
was to allocate resources, the superior court struck down the
provision under the Gilbert testy
In Kenaitze, the superior court added a new condition for
allocating natural resources. It held that, under the "least possible
infringement" standard, the state could not prohibit subsistence
activities in a certain area without first considering whether
resources there could support some kind of balance between all
possible uses."8 Generally, this decision means that the state may
not allocate resources so that one use is excluded in an area while
maintaining others unless there is a finding that resource abun-
dance will not support all uses simultaneously.
V. UNIFYING THEMES AMONG THE EQUAL ACCESS CLAUSES
There are several common themes and principles unifying the
equal access clauses. Among these common themes are the
clauses' reference to territorial fish and wildlife management, their
prohibition on exclusive or special privileges and their focus on
individual admission to resources "user groups."
A. Reference to Territorial Fish and Wildlife Management
In several opinions construing the equal access clauses, the
Alaska Supreme Court has referred to pre-statehood fish and
wildlife management practices. The court has assumed that the
framers of the constitution were aware of these practices, and has
consistently concluded that they did not intend the clauses to
prohibit contemporary practices that are equivalent to historic ones.
In Owsichek v. State, 9 for example, the court stated:
We observe initially that, in guaranteeing people "common use"
of fish, wildlife and water resources, the framers of the constitu-
tion clearly did not intend to prohibit all regulation of the use of
these resources. Licensing requirements, bag limits, and seasonal
restrictions, for example, are time-honored methods of conserv-
85. Id.
86. Kenaitze, No. 3AN-91-4569, slip op. at 4.
87. Id. at 12.
88. Id. at 10.
89. 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
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ing the resources that were respected by delegates to the
constitutional convention.90
Similarly, in State v. Hebert,1 the court observed that gear size
and "time and area" limitations are among "time honored brakes"
imposed on fishermen to achieve conservation.' The court
upheld superexclusive registration for herring fisheries because
convention debates did not reveal an intent to prohibit a compara-
ble, pre-statehood management tool, namely exclusive registration
for salmon fisheries. 93 The court came to a similar conclusion
regarding the ban on fish spotting in Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n v.
State Department of Fish and Game.94 Because the framers of the
constitution submitted the constitutional provision simultaneously
with an ordinance prohibiting fish traps, the court concluded that
the framers had found nothing inconsistent in adopting the
common use clause while concurrently banning certain methods
and means of harvest. 95
Although the court has recognized historic conservation
practices, it is not clear whether the existence of a general
conservation purpose will excuse a violation of equal access
principles. On the one hand, usefulness in wildlife conservation
and management was not sufficient to save the EGA system from
being declared unconstitutional.96 On the other hand, the court
implied in McDowell that an exclusionary system would be more
acceptable if it served conservation purposes. 7
B. Prohibition on Exclusive or Special Privileges
One principle that applies to all of the equal access clauses is
reflected in the wording of the "no exclusive right of fishery"
clause.98 The court has interpreted this clause consistently, stating
that "[a]lthough the ramifications of these clauses are varied, they
90. Id. at 492.
91. 803 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1990).
92. Id. at 866-67.
93. Id. at 866.
94. 838 P.2d 798 (Alaska 1992).
95. Id. at 802.
96. See Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
97. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 9. "We do not imply that the constitution bars all
methods of exclusion where exclusion is required for species protection reasons."
Id.
98. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15.
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share at least one meaning: exclusive or special privileges to take
fish and wildlife are prohibited."99
The court has not limited its "no exclusive right or privilege"
analysis to the "no exclusive right of fishery" clause. The court has
similarly held that the common use and the uniform application
clauses were also intended to prohibit exclusive or special privileg-
es.
100
C. Individual Admission to Resource "User Groups"
The equal access clauses also scrutinize limits on admission to
user groups.' In fact, the EGA system and the rural residency
criterion, the only state actions struck down under the clauses, have
both involved such user group admission limits." z  Thus, it is
important to understand the meaning of "user group" in fish and
wildlife management in order to fully comprehend the application
of the equal access clauses.
In the context of the common use clause, the court has defined
user group according to "the nature of the resource (i.e., fish or
wildlife) and the nature of the use (i.e., commercial, sport or
subsistence)."'0 3  User groups include recreational hunters,
99. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 6.
100. See, e.g., State v. Hebert, 803 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1990).
101. See, e.g., Tongass Sport Fishing Ass'n v. State, 866 P.2d 1314 (Alaska 1994)
("[T]he 'common use' clause of article VIII, section 3, the 'no exclusive right of
fishery' clause of section 15, and the 'uniform application' clause of section 17 are
not implicated unless limits are placed on the admission to resource user groups.").
102. This principle was recognized in a recent superior court decision. In
Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n v. State, No. 1JU-93-274 CI, slip op. (Alaska Sup.
Ct. Sept. 14, 1993), seafood processors challenged an exploratory scallop fishing
permit issued by the Department of Fish and Game to a commercial fisherman.
The permit allowed the fisherman, under the control of department biologists, to
operate a scallop dredge in an area closed to commercial scallop fishing. Id. at 2-
3. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that issuance of the permit violated the equal
access clauses. Id. at 4-5.
The superior court found that the issuance of the permit did not constitute the
opening of a "commercial fishery" because it occurred at an exploratory, test-
fishing stage during which no user group had access to the resource. Id. at 20-21.
"Until the resource is open to recognized user groups, and the plaintiffs are
excluded from a particular user group.... there can be no violation of the 'equal
access clauses."' Id. at 22. This holding is presently being appealed to the Alaska
Supreme Court. Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n v. State, No. S-5987.




subsistence hunters, sport fishermen, commercial fishermen,
personal use fishermen, subsistence fishermen and even profession-
al hunting guides. °4 However, the court has rejected a definition
of "user group" that is based on a particular means or method of
using the resource. For example, persons who operate aircraft for
aerial fish spotting are not a user group for purposes of the
common use clause.105
The court revisited the "user group" issue recently in Tongass
Sport Fishing Ass'n v. State."° In 1991, the Board of Fisheries
allocated chinook salmon in southeast Alaska between the
commercial troll and sport fisheries by establishing a percentage of
the harvestable stock which each group could catch. Several sport
fishing groups filed a suit challenging the allocation scheme,
claiming, inter alia, that the system violated both the common use
and the no exclusive right of fishery clauses of Article VIII.1'
In rejecting the Article VIII claim, the Alaska Supreme Court
restated principles announced in earlier opinions on the equal
access clauses. The court affirmed that the equal access clauses are
not implicated unless the state places limits to admission on
resource user groups. 08 The court cited several opinions, includ-
ing Gilbert and Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n, in which the Board's
authority to allocate among different fisheries had been recognized,
and distinguished allocating resources from placing limits on
admission to resource user groups}°9
VI. THE EQUAL ACCESS CLAUSES' RELATION TO OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The equal access clauses do not function in a vacuum. In fact,
the clauses are significantly influenced by at least two other
constitutional provisions. Specifically, the Alaska Supreme Court
has had to square the equal access clauses with the "preferences
among beneficial uses" clause of Article VIII, section 4. Addition-
104. The court recognized that "[t]he work of a guide is so closely tied to
hunting and taking wildlife that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing
between the rights of a guide and the rights of a hunter under the common use
clause." Owsichek v. State, 763 P.2d 488, 497 n.15 (Alaska 1988).
105. Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n, 838 P.2d at 803.
106. 866 P.2d 1314 (Alaska 1994).
107. Id. at 1315.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1318.
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ally, because the equal access clauses have been called "a special
type of equal protection guarantee," it is necessary to compare the
standard of review used by the court to apply the equal access
clauses with the equal protection test articulated by the court under
Article I, section 1 of the state's constitution.
A. The "Preferences Among Beneficial Uses" Clause
Article VIII, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution provides:
Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other replenishable
resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and
maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preferences
among beneficial uses."°
The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized the tension between the
equal access clauses, which prohibit exclusive rights and special
privileges, and the last phrase of section 4, which authorizes
"preferences." In McDowell v. State,"' Justice Moore rejected
any implication in the majority opinion that all preferences,
especially subsistence preferences, would violate the equal access
clauses.1 2 Justice Moore noted the apparent conflict between the
clauses' prohibition against special privileges and section 4, which
"clearly authorizes some preferences based upon uses.'"113 More-
over, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Rabinowitz argued that the
majority decision would conflict with the explicit language of
section 4, which explicitly authorizes rural preferences."'
The court has attempted to clarify this apparent conflict by
distinguishing between allocating resources among resource uses
and limiting admission to resource user groups. In Kenai Peninsu-
la Fisherman's Cooperative Ass'n v. State"5 the court stated:
While section 15 [the "no exclusive rights" clause] does prohibit
granting monopoly fishing rights, that section was not meant to
prohibit differential treatment of such diverse user groups as
commercial, sports, and subsistence fishermen. To conclude that,
because a certain species is made available for sport fishing in a
given area, commercial fishing of the same species must also be
allowed, would be to go far beyond the purpose of the sec-
tion."6
110. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (emphasis added).
111. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
112. Id. at 13 (Moore, J., concurring).
113. Id. (Moore, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 17 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
115. 628 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1981).
116. Id. at 904.
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In McDowell v. State"7 the court stated that "[t]he state may,
indeed must, make allocation decisions between sport, commercial,
and subsistence users. That authority, however, does not imply a
power to limit admission to a user group." ' As an allocative
system, such application is unauthorized under the "preferences"
phrase of section 4.
B. Equal Access and Equal Protection
Because the uniform application clause requires that laws and
regulations "apply equally to all persons similarly situated,""' 9 it
provides a clear equal protection guarantee for the use and disposal
of natural resources. In McDowell, the court described the equal
access clauses in general as "a special type of equal protection
guarantee."'2  This raises the question of how analysis under
Alaska's equal protection clause differs from analysis under the
equal access clauses, and in particular, under the uniform applica-
tion clause.
The equal protection clause in Article I, section 1 of the
Alaska Constitution provides that "all persons are equal and
entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law
..,12 When determining whether legislation comports with
this clause, Alaska courts employ a "sliding" test that the Alaska
Supreme Court has described as follows:
We first determine the importance of the individual interest
impaired by the challenged enactment. We then examine the
importance of the state interest underlying the enactment, that
is, the importance of the enactment. Depending on the impor-
tance of the individual interest, the equal protection clause
requires that the state's interest fall somewhere on a continuum
from mere legitimacy to a compelling interest. Finally, we
examine the nexus between the state interest and the state's
means of furthering that interest. Again depending upon the
importance of the individual interest, the equal protection clause
requires that the nexus fall somewhere on a continuum from
substantial relationship to least restrictive means."
117. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
118. Id. at 8.
119. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 17.
120. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 11.
121. ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 1.




Before McDowell, the court had said very little about the test
for applying the "uniform application clause," nor had it discussed
the equal access clauses in terms of equal protection. In one
instance, the court opined that in cases involving natural resources
the "uniform application clause" may require more stringent review
of a statute than does the general equal protection clauseY3
However, the court did not articulate a specific standard to be
applied to natural resource cases.
In McDowell, the court implicitly followed an equal protection
analysis in striking down the rural residency preference in the
subsistence law. Placing the McDowell analysis into the equal
protection framework leads to the conclusion that the "individual
interest" at issue was the interest of each person in the state in
participating in subsistence uses of renewable resources. The court
said that this was a "highly important" interest. 24
As for the competing state interest, the court said that it must
be at least "important" to sustain legislation that burdens the equal
access clause.'25  The court noted that an "important" state
interest embodied in the subsistence law was "to ensure that those
Alaskans who need to engage in subsistence hunting and fishing in
order to provide for their basic necessities are able to do so. 1 26
In analyzing the "nexus" between the state's "important"
interest and the legislation's "means" for accomplishing it, the court
held that the government's approach must be the "least possible
infringement on article VIII's open access values."'27 When the
court applied this standard, it concluded that the "means used to
accomplish this purpose [were] extremely crude."'" Specifically,
the court pointed to evidence showing that there were "substantial
numbers of Alaskans living in areas designated as urban who have
legitimate claims as subsistence users. Likewise, there are substan-
tial numbers of Alaskans living in areas designated as rural who
have no legitimate claims.'' 129  Thus, the court's ground for
striking down the rural-urban classification scheme was that it was
123. Gilman v. Martin, 662 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1983).





129. Id. at 10-11.
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both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. 3 ' In his McDowell conc-
urrence, Justice Moore stated that he would have followed an
explicit equal protection analysis under article 1, section 1 of the
Alaska constitution. He argued that the individual interest at
stake, access to wildlife for subsistence purposes, was "a species of
the important right to engage in economic endeavor." ' The
subsistence law, therefore, would be subjected to "close scrutiny,"
and it would have to at least be "closely related to an important
state interest."'32 Justice Moore called the state's interest more
than "important"; it was "compelling."' 33  Therefore, Justice
Moore would have found the subsistence law defective because its
classification scheme established only a modest correlation, rather
than a close relationship, between those who resided in rural areas
and those who were dependent on subsistence hunting and
fishing."
In dissent, Justice Rabinowitz maintained that the individual
interest at stake, the right to participate in subsistence hunting and
fishing, was not a fundamental right. Thus, Justice Rabinowitz
argued, the "strict scrutiny" and "least restrictive alternative"
standards were not applicable.'35 Justice Rabinowitz therefore
concluded that the means-end fit of the subsistence criterion was
sufficiently close to satisfy equal protection under both the
"uniform application clause" and under the general equal protec-
tion clause of the constitution.'36
Recently, the Alaska Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether the Alaska Supreme Court had created a constitutional
analysis for the equal access clauses that was distinct from its
analysis for the equal protection clause. The Court of Appeals
stated that the Alaska Supreme Court appeared to use the same
130. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 10-11. After striking down the "extremely crude"
means for distinguishing persons who were eligible for subsistence uses, the court
suggested a legislative solution: "A classification scheme employing individual
characteristics would be less invasive of the article VIII open access values and
much more apt to accomplish the purpose of the statute than the urban-rural
criterion." Id. at 11.
131. Id. at 13 (Moore, J., concurring).
132. Id. (Moore, J., concurring).
133. Id. (Moore, J., concurring).
134. Id. (Moore, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 19 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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approach for both, requiring the state to meet a rigorous test.137
The state must demonstrate both an "important" legislative
purpose and means narrowly tailored to accomplish that pur-
pose.138
VII. CONCLUSION
The equal access clauses are unique to Alaska's constitution
and, at the same time, based on established, historic principles
arising under the public trust doctrine, pre-statehood fish and
wildlife management policy and equal protection analysis.
Although largely neglected in their first three decades, the clauses
have recently been frequently scrutinized by the Alaska Supreme
Court. In six opinions since 1987, the court has attempted to
clarify the meaning of "equal access" as it applies to Alaska's fish
and wildlife. While exclusive and special privileges to take
subsistence resources are prohibited, these limitations are qualified
by constitutional provisions that authorize limited entry to
commercial fisheries and that enable the state to establish prefer-
ences among various uses. From among these provisions, one
fundamental, consistently applied principle has emerged: Limita-
tions on admission to fish and wildlife "user groups" are subject to
strict judicial scrutiny under the equal access clauses.
Several other principles have evolved pertaining to the
individual equal access clauses. The common use clause, for
example, disallows the "privatization" of public fish and wildlife
resources, especially if special privileges are long-term and do not
compensate the public. The "no exclusive right of fishery" clause
requires a "least possible infringement" inquiry when faced with a
scheme that creates exclusive rights in fisheries, even if it is a form
of limited entry. A similar test under the "uniform application"
clause applies to nonuniform classifications among Alaskans who
harvest these resources.
The pending Alaska Supreme Court decision in Kenaitze
Indian Tribe v. State139 affords the court an opportunity to clarify
the nature of the "access" guaranteed by the constitution.
Owsichek v. State"4 and McDowell v. State'4' hold that "access"
137. Baker v. State, 878 P.2d 642, 644-45 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
138. Id.
139. No. 3AN-91-4569 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 1993).
140. 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
141. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
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means access to membership in a user group. Other decisions hold
that "access" does not mean equal opportunity among user groups
to harvest fish and wildlife.42 However, the issue of whether the
state may limit access to fish and wildlife outside of the context of
a user group has not been decided. 43 Another unanswered
question is whether a restriction on a certain use of a resource may
be justified by the availability of other uses of that resource.'
With Alaska's finite resources and Alaskans' growing demand for
fish and wildlife, the equal access provisions of the constitution will
have a continuing, central role in providing answers.
142. See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula v. State, 628 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1981).
143. There is some support for the idea that the court may limit access outside
of this context. In interpreting the White Act, the territorial predecessor to the
"no exclusive right of fishery clause," the United States Supreme Court stated that
"'[e]xclusive,' as used in Section 1 of the White Act, forbids not only a grant to a
single person or corporation but to any special group or number of people."
Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 122 (1949) (emphasis added).
144. The answer to this question is probably yes. In Alaska Fish Spotters Ass'n
v. State Dep't of Fish and Game, one reason the ban on fish spotting was found
not to violate the common use clause is because there were alternative ways that
aerial spotters could still use the fisheries resource. 838 P.2d at 802.
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